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Medical Crowdfunding, Political 
Marginalization, and Government 




Larry Temkin draws on the work of Angus Deaton to argue that countries with 
poor governance sometimes rely on charitable giving and foreign aid in ways that 
enable them to avoid relying on their own citizens; this can cause them to be unre-
sponsive to their citizens’ needs and thus prevent the long-term alleviation of poverty 
and other social problems. I argue that the implications of this “lack of government 
responsiveness argument” (or LOGRA) are both broader and narrower than they 
might first appear. I explore how LOGRA applies more broadly to certain types of 
charitable giving in developed countries, with a focus on medical crowdfunding. I 
then highlight how LOGRA does not apply to charitable giving aimed at alleviating 
the suffering of the absolutely politically marginalized, or those especially vulnerable 
people to whom governments are never responsive.
1. POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE LACK OF 
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS ARGUMENT
In his challenging and important paper in this volume, Larry Temkin engages 
with economist Angus Deaton’s argument that foreign aid and other charitable 
giving to the neediest countries in the world unintentionally does more harm than 
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good (Deaton 2013, Ch. 7.). We can reconstruct one of Deaton’s arguments for this 
claim as follows:
1. Extreme poverty and other preventable suffering in a given country cannot 
be effectively alleviated in the long-term unless that country’s government is 
fundamentally responsive to its citizens and their needs (e.g., for healthcare, 
education, infrastructure, rule of law, etc.).
2. Governments are responsive to their citizens only to the extent that they 
depend on citizens’ support through taxes, votes, and the like.
3. Large amounts of aid (whether direct foreign aid from governments or chari-
table giving) enable a government to remain in power and attain its goals 
without citizen support; this undermines the government’s reliance on its 
citizens.
4. Therefore, large amounts of foreign aid make governments unresponsive to 
citizens.
5. Therefore, large amounts of foreign aid prevent long-term alleviation of 
extreme poverty and other preventable suffering.
Call this the Lack of Government Responsiveness Argument, or LOGRA. LOGRA 
depends on several controversial empirical claims: (1) that responsive governments 
are necessary for long-term poverty alleviation, (2) that governments will not be re-
sponsive to citizens unless they rely on them for taxes, etc., and (3) that foreign aid 
enables governments to avoid relying on citizens in these ways. For the sake of argu-
ment, assume that these claims are true in at least some cases.
Temkin points out that LOGRA may apply even to demonstrably effective 
giving of the sort endorsed by Effective Altruism (EA). Givers face what (following 
Derek Parfit) Temkin calls an Each-We Dilemma. These dilemmas are cases in which 
an individual can bring about the best consequences by the lights of a certain theory 
by doing one thing, but the overall consequences will be very bad by those same 
lights if others also do that same thing. An individual donation to an effective aid 
organization has a massive positive impact on those who are helped and a tiny nega-
tive impact on government responsiveness. If we assume that it is better for burdens 
to be dispersed among many who each bear only a small cost than it is for burdens to 
be carried by a few who each bear a large cost, then what we ought to do individually 
is give (so that everyone bears the miniscule burden of a government made slightly 
less responsive) rather than refrain from giving (so those few who would otherwise 
be helped bear huge burdens). But LOGRA implies that many donations to effective 
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aid organizations together risk undermining government responsiveness in a way 
that inhibits long-term poverty alleviation, which is a massive burden on everyone. 
Collectively, then, what we all ought to do is refrain from giving.
I will argue that if Temkin is right about this, LOGRA has important implica-
tions that go beyond what he addresses in his paper. First, I explore how a version 
of LOGRA might apply to some forms of domestic charitable giving even in high-
income countries with generally well-functioning governments. This means that 
Each-We Dilemmas concerning charitable giving may be more widespread than 
Temkin suggests. Second, I suggest that there are groups of especially marginalized 
people to whom LOGRA does not apply, because governments never rely on them 
for financial or political support, and therefore have no incentive to be responsive to 
them even in the best of circumstances. It follows that giving that is narrowly aimed 
at alleviating the suffering of these groups is not subject to the particular Each-We 
Dilemma raised by LOGRA.
2. EACH-WE DILEMMAS FOR LOCAL 
GIVING IN AFFLUENT NATIONS
LOGRA highlights one way in which foreign aid undermines government re-
sponsiveness. I am concerned that other forms of charitable giving can similarly 
undermine government responsiveness. In both affluent and poverty-stricken coun-
tries, private individuals or organizations routinely fill gaps in the provision of es-
sential goods and services that can be effectively provided to all in the long term only 
through state intervention. Although this meets the needs of some individuals in the 
short term, it risks seriously undermining the government’s ability or motivation to 
meet all of its people’s needs in the long term. While there are multiple examples of 
this, I will focus primarily on how crowdfunding for medical expenses can undermine 
the political will to fix a broken healthcare system. My arguments are conditional, as 
they depend on controversial empirical assumptions that I am unable to defend here. 
However, even if these particular assumptions are false, a similarly structured argu-
ment should apply in a wide range of analogous situations.
Crowdfunding typically uses web platforms (such as GoFundMe) to solicit direct 
donations from friends and strangers. Crowdfunding to cover healthcare expenses is 
widespread and growing, covering everything from cancer treatment to emergency 
care to experimental treatments to routine expenses for chronic illnesses. There are 
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a number of serious ethical problems with medical crowdfunding. Among other 
concerns, crowdfunding seems to disproportionately and unfairly benefit those who 
are tech savvy, have wide social networks, are seen as deserving of help, and whose 
stories are media friendly; ineffectively distributes aid on the basis of sympathy and 
luck rather than need; and forces recipients to publicly disclose sensitive health in-
formation that they might rather keep private in order to receive funding (see Snyder 
2016 and Berliner and Kenworthy 2017 for more on these and other criticisms).
Another major worry is that crowdfunding enables governments to shirk their 
duties. Campaigns are more frequent in areas with less robust health insurance; for 
example, a randomized survey of GoFundMe crowdfunding campaigns found that “a 
much larger proportion of campaigns than expected were based in states that chose 
not to adopt the Medicaid expansion under the ACA” (Berliner and Kenworthy 2017: 
237). Jeremy Snyder points out that “the sites allow individuals to address their need 
for medical care without addressing the underlying causes of these unmet needs” 
(Snyder 2016: 39). This is exacerbated by the fact that crowdfunding campaigns rou-
tinely ignore structural injustice in their pleas for help. For example, a survey of 
Canadian campaigns found that they focused on the recipient’s personal relation-
ships, needs, and altruistic characteristics and “almost universally did not appeal to 
the perceived injustice of having to resort to crowdfunding by Canadians with an 
existing entitlement to essential medical care, supporting the concern that medical 
crowdfunding can obscure systemic injustices” (Snyder et al. 2017 p.367).
If we assume for the sake of argument that the following (admittedly contro-
versial) premises are true, we can generate a LOGRA for medical crowdfunding in 
affluent countries:
1. Healthcare needs can effectively be met in the long-term only through com-
prehensive government provision of services.
2.  Governments will provide comprehensive healthcare services to all only if 
politically pressured by their citizens to do so.
3. Citizens will politically pressure governments to act only if they perceive a 
pressing need.
4. Medical crowdfunding undermines citizens’ perceived need to advocate for 
comprehensive government provision of healthcare.1
1.  If crowdfunding primarily benefits those who are most skilled at advocating for themselves, it 
risks undermining the perceived need to advocate for government provision of services among those 
who are best situated to do this sort of advocacy in particular.
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It follows that donors in affluent countries who crowdfund the medical expenses 
of their friends and neighbors risk undermining the responsiveness of their govern-
ment in a way that collectively leads to much worse results:
5. Therefore, medical crowdfunding prevents citizens from politically pressur-
ing their governments to provide comprehensive healthcare coverage.
6. Therefore, medical crowdfunding removes incentives for the government to 
provide comprehensive coverage, which prevents the meeting of long-term 
healthcare needs.
Snyder rightly notes that “the contribution of any one campaign to these prob-
lems is minimal, creating a strong argument that the gain to each user offsets the sys-
temic effects of medical crowdfunding” (Snyder 2016 p.41). He goes on to suggest that 
“as a result, it is difficult to make the argument that those seeking access to essential 
medical services through crowdfunding ought not to do so” (ibid).
But this argument moves too quickly, because individual donors to medical 
crowdfunding campaigns potentially face Each-We Dilemmas. Individually, donat-
ing to a campaign clearly does good (although surely not the most good you can do 
with your money in EA terms). Collectively, though, donating to medical crowd-
funding campaigns risks undermining the only sustainable long-term solution to 
meeting everyone’s healthcare needs. This is not to say that we should ignore the 
dire appeals of our family, friends, or strangers for help with their healthcare. With 
Temkin, I am not ready to “sacrifice the current needy on the altar of need minimiza-
tion” (Temkin 2019). But we cannot ignore the fact that medical crowdfunding might 
lead to counterproductive negative effects. We must consider whether our individu-
ally good actions are leading to a collectively terrible result, and continue to grapple 
with the ethics of Each-We Dilemmas in determining whether and how to give to 
medical crowdfunding campaigns.
Even if medical crowdfunding does not in fact undermine government respon-
siveness in the area of healthcare, it is worth exploring whether Each-We Dilemmas 
of this structure arise for other kinds of giving that risk undermining government 
responsiveness narrowly in other areas (such as funding for scientific research or the 
arts). For example, consider U.S. billionaires who make major donations to support 
K-12 public education, such as Mark Zuckerberg’s $100 million gift to Newark, N.J. 
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public schools,2 or the Gates Foundation’s support of public education aimed at im-
proving outcomes for Black, Latino/a, and low-income students.3 For the sake of ar-
gument, assume the (admittedly controversial) claim that the only long-term solution 
for improving educational outcomes across the board for underrepresented students 
is state intervention (such as divorcing public school funding from property taxes 
and providing increased and equitable funding across geographic regions through 
redistributive taxation). Assume also the (again controversial) claim that well-pub-
licized support of equitable public education initiatives by a handful of billionaires 
dramatically lessens Americans’ perception of the need for different tax policies, 
and that this makes the U.S. government less responsive to educational inequality. If 
these claims are true, these billionaire philanthropists face Each-We Dilemmas, and 
risk undermining the only feasible long-term solution to educational inequality.
The worry that private giving might undermine the political will to solve en-
trenched social problems is not new. For example, J. A. Hobson wrote in 1914 that
Every act of charity, applied to heal suffering arising from defective arrangements of 
society, serves to weaken the personal springs of social reform... by the softening in-
fluence it exercises on the hearts and heads of those who witness it. It substitutes the 
idea and the desire of individual reform for those of social reform, and so weakens 
the capacity for collective self-help in society (Hobson 1914 p.296).
This echoes socialist and leftist critiques of EA which suggest that it ignores 
institutional factors and “lets capitalism off the hook” with its tendency to “obscure 
that the ordinary workings of capitalist markets create and exacerbate poverty” 
(Gomberg 2002 p.55).4 LOGRA points out a different way in which charitable giving 
risks undermining institutional effectiveness: not by supporting an exploitative capi-
talist system, but by preventing capitalist governments from functioning as well as 
they could.
2.  The impact of Zuckerberg’s gift has been controversial; see https://www.wsj.com/articles/
newarks-100-million-education-debate-1441752228 [Accessed 22/5/19]. Thanks to Alex Dietz for sug-
gesting this example.
3.  See http://k12education.gatesfoundation.org/what-we-do/ [Accessed 22/5/19]
4.  For further discussion of institutional critiques of EA (and an argument that the only plausible 
versions of these critiques are consistent with EA principles), see Berkey 2018.
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3. LOGRA AND ABSOLUTE POLITICAL MARGINALIZATION
In making his case for LOGRA, Deaton writes, “the need to raise funds exists 
everywhere, and it will often constrain the ruler to pay attention to the demands of 
at least some of the population” (Deaton 2013 p.295, [my emphasis]). However, neither 
Deaton nor Temkin pays sufficiently close attention to the fact that governments are 
responsive only to some of the people residing in their countries. Every government 
is most responsive to certain constituents (e.g., their wealthy political donors). But 
there are some groups to whom governments are not responsive at all. Call them 
the absolutely politically marginalized. Because they are ineligible to vote and/or do not 
contribute tax dollars or other material support to the state, governments that are 
focused on self-preservation will have no direct incentive to be responsive to them 
in any circumstances, even without any financial bolstering from foreign aid. They 
may have indirect incentives if foreign allies put politically pressure on them, or if po-
litically powerful people mobilize on their behalf. But these indirect incentives will 
likely not lead to the same degree of responsiveness as would direct incentives.
Different groups of people are absolutely politically marginalized in different so-
cieties, including (but not limited to): undocumented immigrants, refugees, and those 
denied citizenship (e.g., the Rohingya in Burma); felons in jurisdictions with felony 
disenfranchisement; people who do not pay taxes and systematically lack political 
power (e.g., the chronically homeless and unemployed); and people who are enslaved. 
Non-human animals are absolutely politically marginalized in an even more extreme 
way: they have few to no legal rights, and are incapable of directly giving financial or 
political support to the government. Even if LOGRA succeeds in establishing that 
foreign aid has serious negative consequences for a country as a whole, it does not 
follow that aid that is narrowly aimed at alleviating the suffering of the absolutely 
politically marginalized has the same negative consequences for those marginalized 
people. For we must consider what would have happened had the aid not been given. 
Most people will be worse off if an otherwise responsive government becomes unre-
sponsive as a result of aid. But the absolutely politically marginalized cannot be made 
worse off in this way, since the government is not otherwise responsive to them. And 
so even large amounts of narrowly targeted aid will not harm them, which means that 
donors who provide such aid do not seem to face Each-We Dilemmas.
Temkin suggests that one way to avoid LOGRA is focusing aid not on low-in-
come countries with poor governance, but on poor people in middle-income coun-
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tries with decent governance, such as China and India. We should also consider fo-
cusing our aid efforts on supporting the absolutely politically marginalized in any 
country. And since it is likely that they will remain in the margins unless their gov-
ernments become more responsive to them, we must also think more carefully about 
the value of engaging in political action to encourage governments to become more 
responsive to the absolutely marginalized. This usually happens only insofar as voters 
and taxpayers advocate on their behalf: undocumented immigrants protesting their 
own poor treatment will not motivate a self-interested government to change, but 
politically powerful people protesting this same poor treatment might. Non-human 
animals are incapable of advocating for themselves, but the activism of their human 
supporters has led to major gains in animal welfare laws.
However, we must be cautious that private aid to absolutely marginalized groups 
does not unintentionally undermine the political will to pressure the government to 
become responsive to these groups. For if aid groups step in where governments fail 
in a way that prevents voters from perceiving the dire needs of the absolutely politi-
cally marginalized and pressuring their governments in light of this, we risk another 
version of LOGRA, in which giving to the absolutely marginalized ensures their 
ongoing marginalization. Ultimately, the implications of LOGRA are potentially 
both broader (ruling out medical crowdfunding and perhaps other forms of chari-
table giving in the developed world) and narrower (ruling in giving to the absolutely 
politically marginalized, unless this itself makes governments less responsive) than it 
may first appear. 
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